Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (aff). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. 499 pages.
I had heard about this book for a while, and I finally read it. It is filled with scientific and psychological studies. While I don’t accept all Kahneman’s conclusions, he certainly made me think!
Kahneman begins by saying, “Because it is much easier, as well as far more enjoyable, to identify and label the mistakes of others than to recognize our own” (3). He starts with the assumption that “Most of us are healthy most of the time, and most of our judgments and actions are appropriate most of the time” (4). Yet he devotes much of the book to demonstrating how people typically don’t think about how they think.
He posits that people have two primary ways of thinking. One is what we do quickly and instinctively. We use this method when we are under pressure, and it often works well for us. A second way of thinking is slower and more analytical. The instinctive method of thinking is the “hero” of the book” (21). Kahneman argues that we often make assumptions that are not based on facts. For example, many people assume politicians are more susceptible to adultery than are other professionals. Statistically, that hypothesis is false. We merely hear more about wayward politicians through the media (7).
Interestingly, Kahneman points out that “When faced with a difficult question, one often answers an easier one instead, usually without noticing the substitution” (12). He notes that multitasking is a myth, and we can only pay attention to one thing at a time (23). He argues, “We can be blind to the obvious, and we can also be blind to our blindness” (24).
Kahneman claims that System 1 thinking is our intuition. System 2 is our analytical process. He concludes, “in summary, most of what you (your System 2) think or do originates in your system 1, but System 2 takes over when things get difficult, and it normally has the last word” (25).
Kahneman then discusses “cognitive illusions” (27). He notes that our eyes dilate when we concentrate (32). When we are concentrating, we often miss things that normally would be obvious. He cites the famous “invisible gorilla” experiment in which people failed to see a man in a gorilla suit run out on to a basketball court because they were concentrating on something else (34). He also mentions that laziness is built into our nature, so we tend to grasp on to the simplest explanation without thinking more robustly (35).
Interestingly, he writes that both self-control and deliberate thought originate in the same area of the brain. When we are focused on challenging tasks, we can exhibit less self-control than we normally would (40-41). This phenomenon may explain why normally brilliant people occasionally do such foolish things. Studies show that 4-year-old children who demonstrated self-control had much higher scores on tests of intelligence. There seems to be a link between cognitive control and intelligence (47).
Kahneman goes on to discuss the “priming effect” (52). There have been many interesting studies on this topic. It’s alarming how easily people can be “primed” to think a certain way. In one study, college students were “primed” with words associated with the elderly. Then they were asked to walk down a hallway to another room. The primed students walked more slowly than those who had not been primed (52). When people are “primed” with thoughts of money, they tend to act more selfishly (56). Another famous study asked people who used the coffee or tea in a break room to leave a donation to cover the cost. When a picture of human eyes was taped to the wall, donations increased (57). People knew it was just a picture, yet they acted more honestly when they saw the pair of eyes.
Kahneman demonstrates how words we have heard before appear more reliable and familiar (60). Likewise, if a phrase is frequently repeated, it becomes more believable (62). Sentences written in dark print are more credible than statements in light print (63). It’s amazing how easily human brains can be manipulated.
Kahneman cites the “illusion of causality” (76). We are accustomed to jumping to conclusions throughout the day (79). Doing so is often a time-saving measure, but it can lead us astray.
Kahneman goes on to discuss “framing effects” (88). For example, politicians whose faces look more competent did far better in elections, regardless of their policies. Heuristic is “a simple procedure that helps find adequate though often imperfect answers to difficult questions” (98). An “affect heuristic” is “when people let their likes or dislikes determine their beliefs about the world” (103). Kahneman suggests that System 2 is more of an “apologist” for the emotion of System 1 (103). Kahneman cites the “law of small numbers,” in which the sample size is important in determining the truth of a situation (112).
Kahneman also writes about “regression to the mean,” which is quite fascinating (175). He notes, for instance, that in a golf tournament, some golfers score higher than normal, and others score lower. We tend to assume those trends will continue. But typically, those who played better than normal will do worse the next day, while those who had subpar scores have a better score the next day. He points out that stockbrokers are often duped by trends.
Kahneman brings up the “outcome bias,” which is the illusion that outcomes result from certain actions (205). Often the connection is unclear. This bias is frequently evident in business books that look at the most profitable companies and assume that success is the result of great leadership by the CEO.
Other interesting insights relate to the “planning fallacy” and the “hubris hypothesis” (250, 258). He notes that “90% of drivers believe their driving is better than average” (259). Those who see themselves as “experts” were less likely to be correct on issues. Those most confident were incorrect 40% of the time (263).
Finally, he notes that our brains give priority to bad news (301). Of professional golfers, those who failed to make par on a hole were more likely to make birdy on the next (303). Another interesting finding was that people’s memory of pain was worse than their actual experience of that pain (380). It is what we remember of our experience, more than the experience itself, that matters to us (390). We tend to recall the beginning and end of our experiences more than the duration of them (388).
This book is filled with facts, studies, and observations of human behavior. At times, the studies can become overwhelming. Yet he prompted me to consider my thinking and assumptions. There is much more in this book than what I have highlighted. It is worth the read. It may surprise and convict you that you are not always as rational as you assume.
Rating: 4
