David L. Allen and Steve W. Lemke, eds. Calvinism: A Biblical and Theological Critique (affiliate link). Nashville: B and H Academic, 2022. 541 pages.
Each year, I read up on topics I wish to understand more deeply. I’m currently reading about eschatology and spiritual warfare. One area of thought that has become increasingly prominent of late is Calvinism. There has been a renewed commitment to the doctrine by what some have termed the New Calvinists. Growing up, I assumed I was Reformed in my theological leanings. I enjoy reading Puritan authors, and I certainly hold a high view of God’s sovereignty. Nonetheless, when I saw this book, I thought it might be good to read from the “other” side: those who question Calvinist tenets.
This book was written by a compilation of authors and edited by David Allen and Steve Lemke. It was published by B and H Academic, a Lifeway publisher. It addresses key issues of disagreement between Calvinists and those who reject those doctrines.
Chapters include “A Critique of Total Depravity,” “A Critique of Unconditional Election,” “A Critique of Limited Atonement,” and “Is God’s Grace Irresistible?” The book also addresses historical issues, such as the influence of Augustine on Calvinism and Calvinism on Baptists. Finally, it tackles some other key issues, such as, “The Character of God in Calvinism,” “Determinism and Human Freedom,” and “Evil and God’s Sovereignty.”
I have never been intimidated to read critiques of my beliefs if they are presented in an informed and charitable manner. For the most part, authors of these chapters try to vigorously tackle the problems they see with certain doctrines. They are clearly passionate in their perspective. They also present a mountain of evidence to argue their case. Because there is so much material presented, I’ll merely highlight some of the arguments that stood out to me.
In the introduction, readers are informed that the Dutch Reformed Synod of Dort in 1618-19 was a landmark moment in Calvinism. The Remonstrants, led by Jacob Arminius, were pushing back on what they believed to be theological extremes. They acknowledged that people were incapable of saving themselves or doing good apart from God’s gracious enabling. Nevertheless, they believed that people played a role in their salvation by believing and trusting in God’s provision. The authors claim that labeling these people as Pelagian, or semi-Pelagian, is totally incorrect (2-3). They note that it has been common to accuse anyone who believes people play a role in their salvation as being Pelagian, which the authors claim is unfair and incorrect. In response to the Remonstrants, the TULIP formula was developed (4).
Adam Harwood claims that the concept of inheriting original sin from Adam was foreign to the church until Augustine (20). Augustine taught that sin was carried in the semen that was introduced through sex and contaminated the next generation (22). Augustine was concerned for babies who died before they could be baptized. He believed baptism washed away a baby’s sins. If they were not baptized before they died, they would perish. Many of Augustine’s views on inherited guilt stemmed from his negative view of sex and his views on infant baptism. Harwood suggests that people inherit an “inherited nature” or “inherited consequences,” but he does not believe the Bible teaches that we are born guilty of sin (38). The Synod of Dort essentially claimed that, since fallen people cannot do anything good, they must first be saved so they can believe in Christ (40). He notes, “Thus only those people who have been given the gift of faith will be saved” (41). He quotes John Piper: “Faith is the evidence of new birth, not the cause of it” (41). He also cites Al Mohler, who agrees that regeneration precedes faith (42).
Harwood pushes back on the concept that people must essentially be born again before they can place their faith in Christ. He notes that in the Gospel of John, “faith” is never a noun; it is always a verb. It is something people do. He notes that in scripture, spiritually dead people can and do respond to God. He argues that the command to repent implies that people can repent (46). Finally, he argues that an inability to save oneself is not the same as an inability to accept the salvation God freely offers (47).
Leighton Flowers addresses unconditional election. He believes the Calvinist view of unconditional election stems from a “hyperfocus” on soteriology (50). He claims that Calvinists believe “. . . that God secretly made arbitrary choices before the foundation of the world, unilaterally fixing the eternal destiny of every individual” (51). He argues that Genesis 12:1-3 demonstrates that God calls people for a particular purpose. God called Israel not so they could be saved while the Gentiles could not but so the entire world could be saved through the Israelites. He also argues that accepting salvation is not the same thing as earning it (56).
Flowers quotes John Calvin: “By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or the other of these ends, we say that he has been predestined to life or death” (58).
Flowers notes that “Again and again throughout the Scriptures, the Lord tells us what condition must be met to find favor in his eyes” (66). Flowers concludes, “It seems to me that in the well-meant effort of Calvinists to ascribe things to God they have, maybe unintentionally, also ascribed all bad things to him” (65). This line of attack is used throughout this book. If God determines everything people do, then there is no way to avoid ascribing evil acts to God as well.
Flowers asks, “How would God reasonably be able to ask humankind on judgment day why they did this or that, if the answer was ultimately rooted in something other than the individual’s own agency? Both human responsibility and divine judgment require liberty of the creature’s will” (66). Again, this argument is effective. How can a just God condemn people for doing what he predestined them to do?
Flowers notes that God’s choices are “always good and right” (68). He argues that God predestining people to eternity in hell with no possible opportunity for salvation is not good or just. He also points out that many Calvinists encourage evangelism and missions. He argues that supporting those practices is irrational if evangelism and missions cannot change anyone’s eternal destiny (69). He asks, “If God has unchangeably determined who will and will not believe so as to be saved, then why evangelize the lost?” (69).
David L. Allen writes a chapter critiquing the Calvinist view of limited atonement (71). He begins by claiming, “Limited atonement is a doctrine in search of a text” (71). He has previously written extensively on this subject, which is evident in his approach to examining relevant scriptures. He notes, “It can be said Jesus died for the world, but not in the sense that he died for the sins of every person in the world” (72). He argues that “All orthodox Christians limit the application of the atonement, not its extent” (73). Allen argues that until the 16th century, the church upheld the doctrine of unlimited atonement (74).
Allen suggests that “. . . almost all the arguments in favor of limited atonement are logical and theological rather than biblical” (76). He points out that Calvinists seem to be motivated by their doctrinal system and attempt to fit biblical passages into that structure.
He claims that Calvinists argue that God “. . . desires the salvation of all but decrees only the salvation of the elect” (78). In contrast, Allen argues that “Christ equally desires all to be saved and intends to secure the salvation only of those who do freely believe” (78).
Allen presents an extensive overview of the key verses on which Calvinists base their view of limited atonement, which include Matthew 1:21, John 10:15, Acts 20:28; Ephesians 5:23 (80). Allen addresses each passage and argues that none support limited atonement. He claims, “Limitarians wrongly interpret each of these texts because they assume the verses address the extent of the atonement (a hermeneutical error), speak of the elect as an abstract class (a theological error), and unwittingly employ the negative inferences fallacy (a logical error)” (83).
Allen points out that Calvinists argue that when verses such as Isaiah 53:12, Matthew 28:28, Mark 10:45, and Hebrews 9:28 say “many,” they do not mean “all,” even though they clearly do (83). Allen also notes that even John Calvin had to concede that when John 3:16 claims God loved “the world,” it means everyone (87). Allen suggests that for Calvinists, “The interpretation is solely driven by dogmatics—limited atonement is assumed to be theologically correct, so the texts simply cannot be interpreted to mean what they appear to mean on the surface” (88).
Allen rebuts various Calvinist critiques of unlimited atonement. For example, Calvinists posit that if Christ died for your sins, then you cannot help but be saved (89). They also make a “double jeopardy” argument, claiming that if Christ died for your sins, then you cannot still be in debt for them (93). Allen counters that “nowhere in Scripture is God ever viewed as the ‘creditor’ who is paid a debt via the death of Christ” (93). He adds, “The double-payment argument undermines grace because salvation is then by entailment, ‘owed’ to the elect” (94).
Allen then presents 14 texts that he claims affirm unlimited atonement (104). Some of the most compelling are John 3:16, 1 Corinthians 15:3-4, and 1 John 2:2. Allen asks, “If Christ did not pay the price for the sins of all people, how can God’s promises and proposals of salvation to all people who hear the call be true?” (120). He also questions, “If some of those for whom there is no price paid should believe, could they be saved?” (120). At the heart of Allen’s argument, he asks, “God cannot genuinely offer to anyone something he does not have available to give. Limited atonement undermines and falsifies the well-meant and sincere offer of the Gospel. This dilemma has never been answered coherently by limitarians” (122). It is difficult to justify God offering salvation to all when he clearly knows atonement is unavailable to most people. Allen concludes, “Limited atonement is a doctrine that is hermeneutically flawed, theologically unsound, and logically defective” (127).
Steve Lemke wrote the chapter critiquing irresistible grace (129). He argues that the Remonstrants pushed back against this doctrine at the Council of Dordt (131). He defines irresistible grace this way: “For the grace which the Holy Spirit extends to the elect cannot be thwarted or refused, it never fails to bring them to true faith in Christ” (132). Lemke notes that “monergists” believe people play no part in their salvation (134). There are two theological approaches to people’s wills at this point: compatibilist volition and libertarian freedom (134). The compatibilist believes people have no real choice but to do as God decrees. The libertarian believes people can make choices, though even they cannot choose Christ apart from the Holy Spirit’s enabling.
Lemke points out that the term “irresistible grace” is not found in the Bible (136). Calvinists often pride themselves in being more biblical than others, yet some of their key doctrines are not specifically named in scripture. Lemke argues that passages such as Jesus weeping over Jerusalem make no sense if he knew they could not have received him unless God had applied his irresistible grace to them (140). He also posits that Jesus would not have claimed that it is harder for a rich person to respond to irresistible grace than it is for a poor person (140). If grace is irresistible, then there should be no difficulty in the elect being saved.
Lemke quotes Calvin in his commentary on Acts 2:21: “Therefore since no man is excluded from calling upon God, the gate of salvation is set open to all” (145). It is interesting that throughout Calvin’s extensive writing, he makes many statements that seem to conflict with traditional tenets of Calvinism. Perhaps he was not as strong of a Calvinist as he is made out to be!
Lemke points out that “Whenever anyone in the New Testament asks a direct question about how to be saved, the answer never refers to election” (148). This point is compelling. Jesus certainly could have diplomatically informed people that their names were not written in the lamb’s book of life, so they need not bother. Instead, he always told people what they needed to do to be saved.
Lemke also notes that one of the scriptures Calvinists cite most often on this subject is Romans 8:29-30. Yet he argues that the passage actually undermines their argument. He points out that God’s election does not come first, as Calvinists argue. His foreknowledge does (157). Lemke claims, “ . . . God’s foreknowledge of human responses comes first, with God’s election, calling, and justification flowing from his foreknowledge” (157). He continues, “God does foreknow, elect, and predestine a particular type of person from the foundation of the world—and that is believers! Based on his foreknowledge of those who will (under the conviction of the Holy Spirit) repent of their sins and trust Christ as their personal Lord and savior, God elects, predestines, justifies, and glorifies (Rom. 8:29-30)” (159).
Lemke distinguishes between foreknowledge and causation (101). God may know someone will trust in his offer of salvation without causing them to do so.
A great and awesome God may certainly allow his creatures freedom of thought while remaining the master of the universe. Conversely, “If God is in total control of everything that happens, then he is responsible for all the evil and suffering in the world as well as those who face reprobation for all eternity” (167). Lemke claims that “In Calvinism, God micromanages a universe of puppets; in what we understand to be the biblical perspective, God is so great that he can be in control of the universe even with human choices and natural cause and effect” (168). He argues that “We tend to equate sovereignty with power and control” (171).
Lemke suggests that God uses “prevenient grace” to enable sinful creatures to respond to him in saving faith, which Lemke believes differs from irresistible grace (175). Lemke also pushes back against Calvinist teaching that God does everything to achieve maximum glory. He asks, “Is God’s refusal to save the majority of persons praiseworthy of God?” (178). He adds, “Monergism and irresistible grace do more to besmirch God’s glory than praise him” (179).
Ken Keathley addresses the issue of the perseverance of the saints (185). He points out that many verses promise security to believers, but others give warnings about falling away (186-187). Some denominations, such as Lutherans, tend to take the falling away warnings more seriously, assuming if scripture warns against it, then it must pose some danger. I didn’t perceive this chapter to be as crucial to the discussion as some of the others.
Kenneth Wilson contributed an interesting chapter called “Calvinism is Augustinianism” (213). He claims Augustine was the first to lay the foundations for divine determinism (213). He notes that Calvin quoted from Augustine more than from anyone else, with at least 373 references (214). He points out that Augustine was educated by the world’s three largest deterministic systems: Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Gnostic-Manichaeism (215). Wilson argues that Augustine’s theology was not deterministic at first. Rather, he, like the early church fathers, accepted human free will. He later reverted to his pagan training (215).
Augustine’s early theology spanned 396-411 AD (218). Irenaeus, a dominant church father, claimed God was great enough to allow for human freedom (219). This view was widely accepted in the church at that time. But while he was debating Pelagius in 412 AD, Augustine changed his view (222). This shift was the result of Augustine grappling with the deaths of infants who had not been baptized. Wilson summarizes, “Infant baptism became the impetus for Augustine’s novel theology” (223). Wilson notes that Augustine developed the following system: 1) people lost free will in the Fall. 2) certain individuals were created for the purpose of damnation unto God’s glory. 3) Individuals were culpable, despite their lack of choice to do good or to respond positively. 4) God was just, despite deliberately creating people for eternal torture (226). Wilson concludes, “We possess no writings from any prior Christian author who held such pagan views” (224).
Wilson notes that “Augustine had to redefine the Christian meaning of free will (226). Wilson suggests that “Unconditional election and total depravity (inability) both resulted from Augustine’s logic invented in the novel theology of infant baptism” (228). Augustine notes that “People fail to be saved, ‘not because they do not will it, but because God does not’” (229).
Wilson points out that before Augustine, it was assumed that God chose people based on his foreknowledge of their future choices (233). Harry Wolfson argues that “Augustine’s doctrine of grace is only a Christianization of the Stoic doctrine of fate” (234). Wilson concludes that “He baptized his prior pagan philosophies and religion into Christianity, resulting in an unrecognizable doctrinal conglomeration. Calvinism is Augustinianism” (237).
J. Matthew Pinson contributed a chapter reviewing Baptist history and Calvinism (239). He points out that for the first three centuries of their history, Baptists were generally Calvinist (239). He notes the influence of the New Hampshire Statement of Faith and how it lessened some of the strongest Calvinist emphases (260). This statement provided a foundation for the first Baptist Faith and Message in 1925 (273). Clearly Baptists have always managed the tension of combining both Calvinist and non-Calvinist churches and leaders under the same tent.
There is also a chapter offering a “Wesleyan Critique of Calvinism” (283). The author includes some interesting quotes from John Wesley that demonstrate he had a high view of God and his sovereignty but allowed room for free will.
One chapter examines Romans 9, which has often been used to undergird Calvinist doctrines (307). Some people claim that passage practically forces them to be Calvinist (307). Brian Asbasciano suggests that Paul had corporate election in mind when he wrote it, not individual election (308). He argues, “We must distinguish between corporate and individual election. And we must distinguish between election to salvation and election to a task” (339). He suggests that most of the discussion surrounding election in the Old Testament refers to corporate election (339). He makes the bold claim, “Individual election is restricted to this use—election for service. Individuals are not chosen to be saved” (341). He argues that God chose a people in the Old Testament, Israel, to be a light to the nations. Yet it was possible to be a Jew and yet not be saved. God still required his chosen people to demonstrate faith and obedience. Abasciano concludes, “No one individual is elected by God to be saved, much less irresistibly” (359).
He goes on to claim that “God chooses or elects both corporate groups and individuals. That said, the New Testament presents election to salvation in only corporate terms. Simply put, God has chosen the church in Christ as the ones he will save” (363). He continues, “Individuals can rightfully be labelled as ‘elect’ only because they are members of Christ’s elect body, the church” (364). He adds, finally, “Foreknowledge does not mean election” (365). Western Christians tend to look at everything individualistically. But in biblical times, people were viewed corporately.
Roger Olson wrote a chapter on God’s character and election (367). He begins by citing the great Calvinist theologian Charles Hodge. Hodge claimed that some things are impossible. For example, God cannot contradict himself. He can’t do or approve what is morally wrong. It is also impossible for God’s truths to contradict each other (367). Olson concludes that Calvinism has logical inconsistencies, which Hodge argued could never happen.
He claims that “. . . for John Calvin, as for Augustine before him, God is the all-determining reality who plans, decrees, and renders certain everything that happens in creation without exception” (371). He cites R.C. Sproul, who claimed that “If there is one single molecule in this universe running around loose, totally free of God’s sovereignty, then we have no guarantee that a single promise of God will ever be fulfilled” (373). Sproul adds, “. . . the movement of every molecule, the actions of every planet, the falling of every star, the choices of every volitional creature, all these are subject to his [God’s] sovereign will” (373). He also quotes John Piper, who claimed that if a dirty bomb were to go off in downtown Minneapolis, it would be God’s will for it to do so (376).
Calvinism claims that “Nothing—including sin, evil, and innocent suffering—escapes his control. It is all foreordained and rendered certain, even if indirectly through secondary causes” (376). This understanding, of course, seems to be the Achilles Heel of Calvinism. Olson asks, “In what sense is God just in predestinating people to hell?” (377). One can argue that for people who refuse God’s offer of salvation, hell is their just reward. But what about people who were predestined for hell before the foundation of the world? Olson argues, “. . . God is the ultimate cause of sin, evil, and eternal suffering in hell, even if he only ‘renders them certain’ according to his foreordained plan that he freely designed. This behavior would never be called good and would always be called wrong” (379).
Olson cites Calvinists who argue that hell is necessary to demonstrate God’s hatred for sin and his desire for justice. But Olson argues that the cross has already provided this picture fully, making hell and the predestined destruction of people unnecessary for that purpose (380). He continues, “Again, there is no human analogy in which such behavior would be excused. A person who renders another person’s crime certain, however that may be done, is just as guilty, if not more guilty, than the criminal” (381).
Olson quotes R.C. Sproul, who said, “our final destination, heaven or hell, is decided by God not only before we get there, but before we are even born” (381). When Calvinists are challenged to explain how this predestination is either loving or just, they often refer to the “mystery” of God (383). Yet Olson sees this response as a convenient side-step of an apparent contradiction. He claims, “It is that God is the all-determining reality who decides and determines everything, including the thoughts and motives and actions of every creature, and yet sin and evil cannot be attributed to him but must only be attributed to creatures. This combination of ideas is impossible . . . This combination is not merely a ‘mystery,’ as most Calvinists claim, but it is sheer contradiction—appeals to secondary causes and ‘withholdings’ notwithstanding” (383).
Olson notes that Calvinists claim that God does everything for his own glory and reputation (384). He asks, “But what kind of reputation does that give God? What is glorious, loving, or compassionate about denying salvation to some when God could save all?” (384). He goes on to write, “The plain fact of the matter is, ‘God is good’ means nothing in classical, consistent Calvinism” (386).
Finally, Olson points out passages in which God grieved over the destruction and judgment he would bring on people. Olson asks, “Why would God . . . grieve over that which brings him glory?” (387).
John Laing wrote a chapter on “Determinism and Human Freedom” (389). He compares the compatibilist and libertarian views (390). He points out that there are many places in the Bible in which people are given two options (397). If there is no free will, then the offer to choose is a cruel farce. He also distinguishes between a reason for an action and a cause (401). People can have a reason for doing something without having been caused to do it. He also addresses the challenge of what type of freedom there is in heaven (425). Are people free to choose in heaven? Calvinists would say no and argue that the same kind of freedom is experienced on earth. Laing counters this argument.
Bruce Little contributed a chapter on “Evil and God’s Sovereignty” (433). He quotes John Piper, who claimed God could “take down a plane” whenever he chose (437). Little highlights Calvinist arguments that God allows or determines certain evil acts in order to accomplish his purposes (442). He counters, “One could argue that if God needs particular evils to bring about certain goods, then God is not omnipotent” (442). Little quotes Gordon Clark, who claimed, “I wish very frankly and pointedly to assert that if a man gets drunk and shoots his family, it was the will of God that he should do so” (449). Both Piper and Clark argue that the individual bears moral responsibility for his evil, even though he cannot do otherwise (452). At this point, Calvinism faces some of its greatest assaults. It seems inconceivable to many how a loving God could ever decree or will a man to butcher his own family in order to bring glory and honor to himself.
The book also includes a chapter on public invitations, written by Mark Tolbert. Of course, if everyone who is predestined will inevitably be saved, then it seems redundant to invite people to respond publicly to Christ. The elect will be saved regardless, and the non-elect are merely being mocked by an invitation to do the impossible.
Trevin Wax offers a concluding chapter offering a middle way in which Christians, especially Southern Baptists, can view themselves on a spectrum rather than as right or wrong. This counsel certainly seems wise for the day in which we live.
This is a thick, slow-reading tome! It took me a while to work my way through it. Of course, the writers pick and choose their examples. They certainly make Calvinists appear vulnerable. I hope that there will someday be a Calvinist response to this book that offers a thoughtful explanation and rebuttal.
I have never been comfortable with the notion that God has decreed every single thing that happens. Not only does this understanding remove any sense of responsibility from individuals, but it also makes God the author of every evil act committed. The Bible simply includes too many calls for people to choose, to decide, or to believe for one not to sense that God allows room for people’s volition. Surely God is not deceiving people into thinking they have a choice when they don’t. Scripture also portrays God as grieving for those who reject him and face destruction. Yet if people are merely carrying out God’s predetermined plans, how could he grieve over their actions?
I have always had a high view of God’s sovereignty, but I have never believed it was threatened by humanity’s free will. God is simply too big, too powerful, too all-knowing to be thwarted in the slightest by what people choose to do. What he wills will be done!
This book is not for everyone. But if you are looking for an in-depth read on a serious subject, then it may be for you. Calvinism has certainly experienced a rise in popularity. I think it is wise to familiarize yourself with the issues. I also believe that if Calvinism is truly the most biblical, God-honoring theological system, then it will be able to adequately respond to the charges laid in this book.
Rating: 3
